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REPORT ON THE RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS OF THE SIGNED AND SCANNED VOTER LISTS

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The Citizen Observer Initiative was founded in 2013 with a view to overseeing national and local elections and referenda in Armenia and their compliance with domestic law and the international standards of democracy. The website of the Citizen Observer Initiative is <https://www.citizenobserver.am/>

The website of the Europe in Law Association is <http://ela.am>

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INTRODUCTION

On April 2, 2017 elections to the RA National Assembly were held, which, however, were different from all the previous elections, as they were held in line with the RA new, or as they call it “amended” Constitution adopted during the referendum in December of 2015, according to which the RA NA elections became the only national elections. The position of the RA President became ceremonial, and now the President is elected by the National Assembly.

Besides this core changes, the 2017 NA elections were also marked with the fact that they were held in line with the new Electoral Code (EC).

The constitutional amendments from December 6, 2015 stipulated adoption of a new electoral code before June 1, 2016, which would regulate the details of the new electoral system.

On May, 2016 the new EC was passed along with amendments in related laws (RA Criminal Code, RA Code on Administrative violations, RA Administrative Procedure Code, etc.)

In terms of certain provisions of the EC the state continued discussions

with the political powers, as well as with the international institutions and foreign diplomatic representations, with input of civil society expertise and focusing, in particular, on the organizational-technical mechanisms of control over the legitimacy of the voting process while expecting foreign and international financial assistance.

On September 13, 2016, a working session took place at the National Assembly on finalizing and signing the documents about the administration of electoral processes in the Republic of Armenia, during which representatives of the RPA, PAP, ANC, CoL and ARFD parties in the NA signed a statement.

In line with the agreement reached as a result of the aforementioned process, on October 20, 2016, new amendments were made in the RA Electoral Code as well as in the RA Criminal Code. The political parties came to an agreement on videotaping of the polling stations and online access – live streaming on the voting day, on publishing the signed voter lists after the voting, as well as on other issues.

Another main change of the new electoral code (EC and related legislation) was the publishing of the signed voter lists, a demand that the opposition and the civil society representatives had been raising for many years.

ACCESSIBILITY OF VOTER LISTS IN THE ELECTORAL CODE

In accordance with Article 13 of the RA Electoral Code, the list of voters in the Republic of Armenia, with the exception of cases stipulated by this Code, are free for familiarisation.

The list of voters who participated in the elections, except for lists signed by voters at the military units, penitentiary institutions and detention centers, are published in the manner defined by this Code.

Article 73.3.1 defines that during the elections to the National Assembly, the territorial electoral commission, starting from 12:00 on the day following the election scans the lists of voters, and the electoral commission members, candidates, proxies, observers and mass media representatives can monitor the process.

The lists of the voters are scanned in the manner defined by the Central Electoral Commission and in line with the criteria so that the voter's successive number, surname, name, patronymic, date of birth, registration address, as well as the signature, the columns for the individual stamp of the commission member responsible for the registration of the voter can be seen on the list of voters of the given polling station.

No later than 24 hours after the start of the scanning, the scanned lists of voters are published with the opportunity to download, and search according to the polling station, and are uploaded on the official website of the Central Electoral Commission.

PUBLICATION OF THE LISTS

The CEC published the signed list of voters on its website in the morning of April 4, 2017. However, it was not possible to open them.

On April 4, 2017, the “Citizen Observer” initiative made a statement, that as of 19:00, April 4 the links put on the official website of the CEC mostly did not function.

“That means that with the failure of the commitment taken by the authorities the requirement of the electoral code was violated.

Although with the link elections.am/list one can find the names of the signed lists of voters, in fact they are not accessible. The list of each polling station can be seen after long attempts of trying to open it, however, even this opportunity is not accessible in case of all the lists of polling stations. In the majority of cases it is simply impossible to see the contents of lists. In fact the signed lists of voters are not accessible to the citizens, observing organizations and parties”, says the statement of the “Citizen Observer” initiative

The “Citizen Observer” reminded that the deadline for submission of complaints against the electoral violations related to voter lists is at 11:00, 05.04.2017.

“We have reasonable doubts that this practice by the CEC is not a result of a technical failure, but a practice to aimed at hiding the true picture of participation in the elections, not excluding the goal of depriving the process participants of the reasonable opportunity to submit claims against false participation” says the statement.

On April 6, 2017, the RA Central electoral commission disseminated a clarification according to which the complications regarding the downloading of voter lists were connected with the traffic of the website, and the lists were published via alternative sources.

It is noteworthy that the alternative link was placed on the “google drive” server, which belongs to “Google”, and the account through which the aforementioned alternative link was published belongs to Davit Harutyunyan, then Minister-Head of the RA Government staff. That means that the signed voter lists were first accessible to Davit Harutyunyan, and only after that uploaded to the mentioned server following which they were made accessible.

DIGITIZATION AND PROCESSING OF THE SIGNED VOTER LISTS

Irrespective of all the legislative impediments, publication of the scanned voter lists allowed to identify a number of violations, including inconsistency between the number of voters who participated in the voting published by the Central Electoral Commission and the number of signatures on the lists, cases of double voting, voter impersonation.

Taking into consideration the materials resulted from the observation of the NA elections on 02.04.2017, in particular, the scanned copies of the signed voter lists, and such problems that were identified during their initial analysis, which were able to impact the results of the elections, the “Europe in Law Association” non-governmental organization, operating within the scope of the “Citizen Observer” initiative, found it necessary to conduct an in-depth analysis of the signed voter lists, for the purpose of which the lists were digitalized, i.e. a relevant system was created (computer software), in which the data from the relevant fields of the signed voter lists were entered.

Three programmers were engaged to create the system and provide current service, who conducted the activities on a pro bono basis, 15 persons were entering the information and one person was coordinating the activities.

An analyst was engaged to study and sum up the work after it was finished.

We studied the downloaded copies of the scanned signed voter lists right after they were published on the CEC website. Several months after the publication, certain changes were made in the scanned lists published on the CEC website: e.g., the lists containing the identity data of the voters were replaced with scanned lists not containing such data. Other possible changes were not studied within the scope of this research.

THE PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF PROCESSING THE SIGNED VOTER LISTS

THE DATA OF DOCUMENTS CONTAINING VOTER IDENTITY INFORMATION

Although the EC defines that the list of voters should be scanned in the manner and according to the standards defined by the Central Electoral Commission so that along with the lists they do not publish the voters' identity data, in scanned lists from a number of precincts those data were visible.

In this relation the personal data protection agency of the RA Ministry of Justice started a proceeding on publishing the identity document data along with the scanned voter lists. The agency made a decision to demand from the RA Central Electoral Commission within three days to block the passport data of the voters who participated in the voting.

Attention should be paid to the fact, that although the cases of publishing the identity data were few, the study of those data allowed to disclose that there were precincts where the same identity data were repeated, i.e. in front of the name/surnames of various voters who participated in the voting there was the same ID information. The mentioned fact comes to prove that cases of voter impersonation or double voting occurred.

In the scanned lists from 650 precincts there were data from 10 and more voters. In the scanned lists from 294 other precincts there was the ID data of at least one voter in each precinct.

REPEATED ID DATA

As a result of the study of scanned voters lists at least 30 precincts were identified where there was at least one (in each precinct) matching of passport data.

E.g.

In precinct 35/61, the passport data of PoghosyanMartik and StepanyanArtyom match, moreover, the individual stamp of the commission member also matches.

ArtyomStepanyan

ԱՅՈՒՆԻՔ ԵՆՈՒԻ (ԳՆԱԳԻՏԱԿԱՆ ԿԵՆՏՐՈՆ)				ՓԱՐԱՍԱԳԻ ԶԻՎ 1)		ԸՆԴՀԱՆՈՒՐ ԸՆԴՈՒՄ 35		ԶԻՎ 35/61	ԸՆԴՈՒՄԿԱՆ ՎՈՒՅՈՒՄ
Գ/Գ	Ազգանուն	Անուն	Քաղաքանուն	Ծննդյան օր, ամիս, ամիսընթաց	Չափական վայրի հասցի	ԱՆՏ ԽԱՏԱՆՈՒՄ ԳԻՏԱԿԱՆՈՒՄԻ ԱՅԻՆ ԻՆ ԽԱՏԱՆ	ՕՐԱՐԱՊ ԵՐԱՐՈՒՄԻ ԵՐԱՐՈՒՄ	ՔԱՆՈՒՄԿԱՆ ԳՐԱՆՁԱՆԻ ԽԱՏԱՆ	ԼՈՍՏՐԱՊ ԿՐՄԱՆԻՔ
1709	Արվիշյան	Նորիկ	Սկյուրիչի	10/07/1956	Փարսազի փ. 42 19				
1710	Ասիսյան	Լյուբա	Օգանուի	20/02/1958	Փարսազի փ. 42 19	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1711	Գրիգորյան	Սուսաննա	Գուրգենի	13/06/1952	Փարսազի փ. 42 21	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1712	Ավագյան	Ավետիս	Իսրայելի	10/02/1957	Փարսազի փ. 42 22	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1713	Ավագյան	Գեղամ	Այնտիսի	09/06/1993	Փարսազի փ. 42 22	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1714	Ավագյան	Նարեկ	Այնտիսի	07/10/1991	Փարսազի փ. 42 22	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1715	Բարսեղյան	Լիլիթ	Անդրանիկի	12/09/1993	Փարսազի փ. 42 22	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1716	Դովիանիսյան	Բնարիկ	Պարեգենի	21/11/1962	Փարսազի փ. 42 22	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
1717	Ստեփանյան	Արտյոմ	Դովակիմի	30/11/1988	Փարսազի փ. 42 23	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936

MartikPoghosyan

412	"Պողոսյան	Ջարսբյուրև	Սարտիկ	22/08/1959	Գործարանայրա ա. 00	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
413	"Պողոսյան	Սարտիկ	Ջարսբյուրև	25/04/1987	Գործարանայրա փ. 65	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936
414	"Պողոսյան	Ռուսուֆ	Ջարսբյուրև	03/07/1988	Գործարանայրա փ. 65	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936	AK054936

In precinct 1/15 the passport data of Yuri Atoyan and HripsimeHarutyunyan match, moreover, the signatures are the same, and in front of Atoyan Yuri's name there is no individual stamp of the commission member.

Yuri Atoyán

584	Կյուրեղյան	Գայկ	Արթուրի	09/05/1991	Թուժանյան Թիժ. 7/2	9	ԱՄՆ ԿԵՂԵՎ	AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-045203
585	Արդյան	Յուրի	Սարգսիսի	25/09/1967	Թուժանյան Թիժ. 7/2	11		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08281
586	Դավթյան	Ռուզա	Կարապետի	11/12/1944	Թուժանյան Թիժ. 7/2	11		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08281

HripsimeHarutyunyan

684	Դարությունյան	Դուսիկ	Բախչիի	24/05/1924	Թուժանյան Թիժ. 8	6		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
685	Դարությունյան	Դոկիսիմոն	Դուսիկի	19/04/1960	Թուժանյան Թիժ. 8	6		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
686	Բարսեղյան	Արմեն	Ավետիկի	30/01/1986	Թուժանյան Թիժ. 8	7		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-07881

In precinct 1/21 the passport data of Karen Alanakyan and Tigran Barseghyan match.

Karen Alanakyan

1203	Սամուկյան	Լիաննա	Սասունի	17/03/1987	Չարենց Թիժ. 15	5		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-05067
1204	Ավանյան	Կարեն	Վազգենի	04/03/1940	Չարենց Թիժ. 15	6		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-05288
1205	Ավանյան	Սամվել	Կարենի	29/01/1979	Չարենց Թիժ. 15	6		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-05288

Tigran Barseghyan

1237	Բարդսյան	Արիինյա	Ռաֆայելի	21/01/1961	Չարենց Թիժ. 15	16		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-05280
1238	Բարսեղյան	Տիգրան	Թելմանի	09/03/1980	Չարենց Թիժ. 15	17		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-05280
1239	Թովմասյան	Արտակ	Գրիշ	20/04/1977	Չարենց Թիժ. 15	18		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-05280

In precinct 4/33, the passport data of KasyanArmen and AmirKhanovaKarine match. Moreover, the commissions member's individual stamp and signature also match.

KarineAmirkhanova

1023	Ամիրխանյան	Արմեն	Սեդրակի	26/02/1946	Ստանի Գ. 4	3		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08193
1024	Ամիրխանյան	Կարինե	Շապուգի	04/08/1977	Ստանի Գ. 4	3		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08193
1025	Բարդսյան	Գրիգորի	Վիլիկի	26/08/1957	Ստանի Գ. 4	3		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08193

Armen Kasyan

1041	Դեմիրճյան	Տարսե	Լիզարիտի	09/05/1998	Ստանի Գ. 4	14		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08193
1042	Կասյան	Արմեն	Ստեփանի	07/03/1982	Ստանի Գ. 4	17		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08193
1043	Պողոսյան	Իզարելյան	Գրիգորի	15/08/1949	Ստանի Գ. 4	17		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-06105
1044	Դավթյան	Ռուզա	Ստեփանի	01/09/1946	Ստանի Գ. 4	18		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-08193

When analyzing the general picture of the studied precincts, the probability is great that similar cases are also available in the precincts, the scanned lists of the voters' ID data from which have not been published in accordance with the law.

In certain precincts, figures and letters are written in the field of the ID data (e.g. VAD29989), which are not consistent with the serial numbers and standards of either the passports issued in RA, or ID cards. Quite possibly the sequence of these letters and figures are the successive number of the VAD printouts. However, even in the given case matching of these successive numbers have been identified in the same precinct, whereas the numbers should be different for all the printouts. As a result of sample checking of the mentioned cases it was identified that in case of the successive number of repeated printouts the individual stamp of the commission member is the same and the signature of the voters were the same.

E.g.

In precinct 2/24 the data entered in the column "ID" under the name DavtyanValeri and MkrtchyanAdita match.

1260	Ավետիսյան	Ալիսա	Դարույի	28/04/1990	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 25	33		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
1261	Դավթյան	Վաչեղի	Վարդանի	07/10/1947	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 25	33		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
1262	Դավթյան	Վարդան	Վաչեղի	04/01/1986	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 25	33		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
1263	Նազարյան	Դավթյան	Եղիշի	25/05/1960	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 25	34		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563

ԵՐԿՎԱՆ ԼՈՐ ԼՈՐԷ (ԹԻՎ 88 ԳՊՐՈՑ (1+Կ ՏԵՂԱՄԱՍ) (ՎԱՐՄԱՆԱՆՅԱՆ Փ. ԹԻՎ 11))				Ընտրատարածք 2		Թիվ	2/24	ընտրական տեղիան
3/9	Ազգանուն	Մականուն	Պաշտոն	Օմնիպոտ զր. անիստ. անդամ	Պաշտոնական վերջին հասցի	Անճառ հասցեագրության անհամար	Օմնիպոտ ստորագրություն	Պաշտոնական անձնագրի համար
1373	Սկրտչյան	Եղիշա	Դանիելի	01/02/1962	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 26	36	AM0835911	ԳԴ-05280
1374	Սկրտչյան	Սևակ	Դանիելի	12/10/1982	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 26	36	AM0835911	ԳԴ-05280

In precinct 2/24 almost 10 cases were identified when the data entered in the "ID" column match. Another example from this precinct.

501	Չամբայան	Ասրգիս	Արտավազի	21/04/1951	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 18	23		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
502	Չամբայան	Արթուր	Ռաֆայելի	11/09/1976	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 18	24		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
503	Չամբայան	Պարսիկ	Ռաֆայելի	02/08/1974	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 18	24		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
504	Կիրակոսյան	Աստղիկ	Պրոնիկի	14/08/1954	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 18	24		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563
505	Ասրադյան	Լուսինե	Արտուրի	22/04/1960	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 18	24		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04563

1471	Բեգլարյան	Արտուր	Արմենակի	01/01/1941	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 39	29		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04834
1472	Սարգսյան	Աննաիտ	Սամվելի	05/08/1951	Լոռ Լոռք 7 Թեզ. 39	29		AM0835911	ՅԵՄԻ	ԳԴ-04834

INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN THE DATA AND SIGNED VOTER LISTS PUBLISHED BY THE CEC

Publication of the signed voter lists allowed to get precise information as to how many people participated in the voting in the precincts. Comparison of these data with the data published on the CEC official website revealed a number of interesting circumstances, e.g. that the mentioned data do not match. It means that the number of voters' signatures available in the signed lists is mostly less than the total number of participants in the voting on the CEC website. As a result of sample checking in almost all cases it was identified that in the signed lists the number of signature is always less than the total number of actual voters published on the CEC website.

E.g., in precinct 1/1, according to the signed lists 1251 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of actual voters in this precinct was 1257.

In precinct 1/2, according to the signed lists 1221 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1224.

In precinct 1/3, according to the signed lists 1153 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1255.

In precinct 1/5, according to the signed lists 1115 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1117.

In precinct 1/6, according to the signed lists 1210 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1212.

In precinct2/1, according to the signed lists 1181 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1184.

In precinct2/9 according to the signed lists 1225 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1235.

In precinct2/16, according to the signed lists 1047 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1051.

In precinct2/18, according to the signed lists 1187 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1198.

In precinct 2/31, according to the signed lists 1032 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1036.

In precinct2/40, according to the signed lists 1059 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1065.

In precinct 3/04, according to the signed lists 1207 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1211.

In precinct 7/51, according to the signed lists 879 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 886.

In precinct8/25, according to the signed lists 1262 voters participated in the voting, whereas according to the CEC website the total number of voters at this precinct was 1269.

At the same time cases were identified when there were two signatures in front of the voter's name, but only one of them was validated by the individual stamp of the commission member, in case of which the second signature cannot be considered as valid. Consequently, the total number of voters should be reduced by the number of such cases.

OTHER VIOLATIONS

(REPEATED STAMPS, SIGNATURE WITHOUT A STAMP, STAMP WITHOUT A SIGNATURE, ETC.)

Article 11 of the EC defines the requirements related to voter lists. Besides the successive number, name, surname, patronymic, date of birth and registration address in voter list of that precinct, there are 4 more columns on the list:

- 1) for the voter's ID data
- 2) for the voter's signature
- 3) for the individual stamp of the commission member responsible for the registration of the voter
- 4) for additional notes. Additional notes are made in the voter lists in the cases and manner defined by the CEC.

In accord with the Decree N126-N on making notes in the “additional notes” column of the CEC voter list, the precinct commission member responsible for the registration of the voters, when identifying a misspelling or a technical mistake (in case the rest of the voter data are consistent), informs the PEC Chairperson about it, makes notes in the “additional notes” column of the voter list and gives the voter a chance to participate in the voting.

The study of the signed voter lists shows that no misspellings or technical mistakes have been identified in the lists, as no notes were made in the “additional notes” column.

Instead, a number of cases of wrongful filling in of the lists were identified, when the voter's signature is there, but without a stamp, or there is a stamp, but without a signature. There are many cases when the voters have signed in the field not for the signature or the stamp was put not in the column for the individual stamp of the commission member responsible for the registration of voters.

Examples

ԼՈՒՈՒ	ՄԱՐԿ	ՍԱՐՎԱՆՑ	ՀԱՄԱՐԱՆՔ	Շնորհաբեր 22 տեղամաս 22/16
Ազգանուն	Վանահայրանուն	Հայրանուն	Շնորհաբերի անվանումը կամ անվանումը և հասցեն	Շնորհաբերի անվանումը կամ անվանումը և հասցեն
1	Սարգսյան	Գրիգորի	ՎՊԿ 1234	ՄԱՐԿ 13867
2	Սարգսյան	Գրիգորի	ՎՊԿ 1234	ՄԱՐԿ 13867
3	Սարգսյան	Գրիգորի	ՎՊԿ 1234	ՄԱՐԿ 13867
4	Սարգսյան	Գրիգորի	ՎՊԿ 1234	ՄԱՐԿ 13867
5	Սարգսյան	Գրիգորի	ՎՊԿ 1234	ՄԱՐԿ 13867

In the additional list of precinct 22/16 there is no commission stamp, and in the additional notes field in front of all the successive numbers there is a note saying “mistake”.

In relation to this case it is worth mentioning that it is completely unclear based on what facts the PEC concluded that a mistake in voting was made and what the legal consequences of this was. There are data missing whether the mentioned cases were calculated as valid voting, or they were seen as cases of voter impersonation. The given cases were not referred by the election administration bodies, i.e. the commissions, to the police or to the prosecutor's office, and no effective remedies was undertaken to protect the citizens' electoral rights.

At the precinct 38/34, 11 out of 31 pages of the list are additional pages due to their location: in that part there are data relating to about 200 voters; in front of some voters' names the address is incomplete, the community name is different.

ՀԱՏ ՉՏԱԿԵԼՈՒ ԿԱՅՐԻ ԱՍՏՆԱԿԻՑՆԵՐԻ ԼՐԱՅՈՒԹԻՉ ՑՈՒՑԱԿ

ՏԱԿՈՒՇ ԱՄՈՒՆ ԿԱԿԱՂՅՈՒՄ ԳԱՄԱՅՆՔ

ՏԱԿՈՒՇ ԱԿՏՈՂՈՑՈՒՄ (ԳՊՈՒԾ, 2 Փ. ԹԻՎ 7)

Ընտրատարածք 38 Զիլ 38/34 բնակավայրի տեղամաս

Գ/Գ	Ազգանուն	Անուն	Քաղաքանուն	Ծննդյան օր, ամիս, տարեթիվ	Քաղաքանուն և հասցե	Ամբիոնի համարը	Մասնակցության օրը	Վերջին անգամ օգտագործված օրը	Լրացված կտրոններ
381	Արսլյան	Գրամտ	Գեղիկի	06/12/1988	Անտառաշեն				
382	Առուշանյան	Ասրեն	Ավերանդրի	14/06/1978	Գևորգյան				
383	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	25/07/1989	Գարգաս				
384	Արխաղանյան	Մանվել	Գեղամանայի	22/09/1989	Գյումրի				
385	Եղիազարյան	Յիգրան	Գրայրի	12/11/1992	Կոնստանդուպոլիս				
386	Թատոյան	Խորեն	Արսենի	23/11/1994	Վերին Բաղամարտ				
387	Կիրակոսյան	Արսեն	Ասրենի	03/10/1996	Կախան				
388	Դիլիանյան	Վահան	Գրիչայի	11/03/1974	Շահումյան				
389	Գրիգորյան	Արտակ	Անդրանիկի	16/03/1994	Շահումյան				
390	Ասարյան	Գրիգոր	Էդուարդի	11/01/1980	Շահումյան				
391	Դանդալյան	Սեդրակ	Արաբաձորի	10/05/1986	Շիրակ Մարտիկ 1 Թղմ. 2 22				
392	Մելքոնյան	Արթուր	Նապոլեոնի	19/03/1985	Արագածոտն Ծիլքար 1 հսրգ. 2 Փլղ. 2 Ցճակ				
393	Տեղյան	Գրիգոր	Կազիկի	10/01/1996	Արտաշատի Կառու 1 Փ. 2				

This case creates reasonable doubt either about voter impersonation or double voting. The given cases as well were not referred by the election administration bodies, i.e. the commissions, to the police or to the prosecutor's office, and no effective measure was undertaken to protect the citizens' electoral rights.

In the additional handwritten list at precinct 38/43 the name, signature, stamp of the Commission Chairperson and precinct-related data are missing.

ՀԱՏՈՂՈՒՆԵՐԻ ԼՐԱՅՈՒԹԻՉ ՑՈՒՑԱԿ

ՄԱՐԶ _____ ՀԱՄԱՅՆՔ _____

Ընտրատարածք _____ տեղամաս _____

ԸԸ	Ազգանուն	Անուն	Հայրանուն	Ծննդյան օր, ամիս, տարեթիվ	Հայրանուն և հասցե	Ամբիոնի համարը	Մասնակցության օրը	Վերջին անգամ օգտագործված օրը	Լրացված կտրոններ
1	Բաղդասարյան	Գրգորյան	Վահանի	08.04.87	Կոնստանդուպոլիս				
2	Կոնստանդյան	Գրգորյան	Վահանի	08.12.88	Գրգորյան				
3	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	10.02.88	Գարգաս				
4	Կոնստանդյան	Գրգորյան	Վահանի	21.07.89	Կոնստանդուպոլիս				
5	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	17.10.88	Գարգաս				
6	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	12.11.88	Գարգաս				
7	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	20.05.97	Գարգաս				
8	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	08.07.88	Գարգաս				
9	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	05.03.88	Գարգաս				
10	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	25.02.88	Գարգաս				
11	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	14.09.88	Գարգաս				
12	Արսլյան	Արտուր	Գազիկի	25.08.88	Գարգաս				

Զիլ _____ տեղամասին ընտրական հանձնաժողովի նախագահ _____

4.5

In fact, this list is invalid, and votes in them cannot be considered as valid. Consequently, the published number of voters should be reduced accordingly. The given cases as well were not referred by the election administration bodies, i.e. the commissions, to the police or to the prosecutor's office, and no effective measure was undertaken to protect the election right.

* * *

In 2 parts of the additional list in precinct 14/16, there are data about the same people, however the stamps and signature are different.

Part 1

ԱՐՄԱԿԻՐ ՍՄՐԶ		ՎԱՐԱՐՇԱՊԱՏ		ՀԱՍՏԱՅՔ					
ԱՐՄԱԿԻՐ ՎԱՐԱՐՇԱՊԱՏ (ԷՏԱ.Թ.Զ ՄԱՆՎԱՐԱՐՏԵՆԸ Ա.ՄԵԽԱԿՅԱՆ 35/2)									
Ձ/Գ	Ազգանուն	Անուն	Քաղաքանուն	Ծննդյան օր, ամիս, տարեթիվ	Քաղաքական փոքրի խոսք	Անձի հաստատող ֆունկցիոնարի ստորագրությունը և հասցեն	Մասնակցի ստորագրությունը	Քվեարկության արձանագրության գրանցման համարը և անհատական կոդը	Կուրսային կոդ
1992	Միկոյան	Արթուր	Մարտինի	17/10/1989	Արմավիր Սեճանոր 1 Թղձ. 40 46	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-00165	
1993	Կարապետյան	Արամ	Մանվել	19/04/1989	Շիրակ Աշոցք Կրասադ 4 Փ. 2	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-01330	
1994	Մինասյան	Տիգրան	Գովիկի	05/01/1993	Տավուշ Իջևան Նալբանդյան Փ. 30 8	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-001765	
1995	Մկրտչյան	Արմեն	Մարտունի	14/11/1978	Արմավիր Վարդաշապատ Սուրբ Մարիան Թ. 51	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-01033	

Part 2

ԱՐՄԱԿԻՐ ՍՄՐԶ		ՎԱՐԱՐՇԱՊԱՏ		ՀԱՍՏԱՅՔ					
ԱՐՄԱԿԻՐ ՎԱՐԱՐՇԱՊԱՏ (ԷՏԱ.Թ.Զ ՄԱՆՎԱՐԱՐՏԵՆԸ Ա.ՄԵԽԱԿՅԱՆ 35/2)									
Ձ/Գ	Ազգանուն	Անուն	Քաղաքանուն	Ծննդյան օր, ամիս, տարեթիվ	Քաղաքական փոքրի խոսք	Անձի հաստատող ֆունկցիոնարի ստորագրությունը և հասցեն	Մասնակցի ստորագրությունը	Քվեարկության արձանագրության գրանցման համարը և անհատական կոդը	Կուրսային կոդ
1992	Միկոյան	Արթուր	Մարտինի	17/10/1989	Արմավիր Սեճանոր 1 Թղձ. 40 46	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-00165	
1993	Կարապետյան	Արամ	Մանվել	19/04/1989	Շիրակ Աշոցք Կրասադ 4 Փ. 2	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-01330	
1994	Մինասյան	Տիգրան	Գովիկի	05/01/1993	Տավուշ Իջևան Նալբանդյան Փ. 30 8	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-001765	
1995	Մկրտչյան	Արմեն	Մարտունի	14/11/1978	Արմավիր Վարդաշապատ Սուրբ Մարիան Թ. 51	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	<i>AKO 6198/4</i>	ՀՀ-01033	

These cases as well prove that voter impersonation, or double voting occurred. The given cases as well were not referred by the election administration bodies, i.e. the commissions, to the police or to the prosecutor's office, and no effective remedies were undertaken to protect the citizens' electoral rights.

* * *

At the precinct 36/43 (VayotsDzor, Zaritap (Martiros)) in the signed by voters lists the individual stamps of the commission members are missing.

According to the electoral code, in the described case in the given precinct the results of the voting cannot be considered valid. However, neither the precinct commission nor the CEC referred to this fact, which proves inaction by the upper commissions.

ՎԱՅՈՏ ԶՈՐ ԶԱՐԻՏԱՓ(ՄԱՐՏԻՐՈՍ) (ՄՇԱԿՈՒՅԻՏԻ ՏՈՒՆ 1 Փ.1 ՆՐԲ.Ը.2)		Ընտրատարածք 36		Թիվ 36/43		ընտրական տեղամաս			
Ձ/Գ	Ազգանուն	Անուն	Քաղաքանուն	Ծննդյան օր, ամիս, տարեթիվ	Քաղաքական փոքրի խոսք	Անձի հաստատող ֆունկցիոնարի ստորագրությունը և հասցեն	Մասնակցի ստորագրությունը	Քվեարկության արձանագրության գրանցման համարը և անհատական կոդը	Կուրսային կոդ
135	Պապարյան	Զնուրիկ	Պարույրյան	19/06/1991	3 Փ. 13		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
136	Վարդանյան	Արտուր	Մնացականի	02/04/1992	3 Փ. 13		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
137	Գրիգորյան	Արտուր	Վազգենի	19/05/1995	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
138	Գրիգորյան	Սարգիս	Վազգենի	19/07/1992	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
139	Գրիգորյան	Վարդուհի	Վազգենի	17/06/1991	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
140	Վարդապարյան	Յուրիկ	Կոլյայի	22/11/1966	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
141	Վարդանյան	Ալեկոյ	Մնացականի	03/12/1994	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
142	Վարդանյան	Արման	Մնացականի	29/05/1990	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
143	Վարդանյան	Վանուշի	Վանուշի	02/02/1967	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
144	Վարդանյան	Վահիկա	Վանուշի	22/05/1971	3 Փ. 13Ա		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
145	Գրիգորյան	Գրիգոր	Ռուբենի	06/04/1947	3 Փ. 14		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
146	Գրիգորյան	Նաիրա	Ռուբենի	25/01/1998	3 Փ. 14		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
147	Արսայան	Արսիս	Միխայիլի	09/04/1992	3 Փ. 15		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
148	Բալասյան	Ալեկոյ	Միխայիլի	30/06/1996	3 Փ. 15		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
149	Բալասյան	Միխայիլ	Սպարո	19/01/1963	3 Փ. 15		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
150	Բալասյան	Էռուշակի	Միխայիլի	06/08/1994	3 Փ. 15		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
151	Գրիգորյան	Նուրմախար	Գրիգորի	04/11/1972	3 Փ. 15		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
152	Եղիազարյան	Արտուր	Սեյրաբի	13/07/1973	3 Փ. 16		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
153	Ստեփանյան	Կարլեն	Պատվականի	07/03/1941	3 Փ. 16		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		
154	Ստեփանյան	Պատվական	Կարլենի	01/01/1973	3 Փ. 16		<i>AKO 6198/4</i>		

* * *

In precinct 781, almost 2000 cases were identified in which there is a signature in front of the voter's name, however the individual stamp of the commission member is missing.

This fact as well proves that in all the cases when one of the validity conditions of the voting is missing, these cannot be considered as cases of voting, which reduces even more the number of voters as compared with the published figure.

Precinct 8/59

587	Ներսիսյան	Ջեյնեն	Վրույրի	03/07/1994	Լորագավիթ 6 Փ. 20				
588	Իւրանեյան	Արտյոն	Ժիրայրի	28/08/1984	Լորագավիթ 6 Փ. 21				
589	Իւրանեյան	Միլայր	Սերգեյի	20/03/1956	Լորագավիթ 6 Փ. 21				

Precinct11/39

291	Գալստյան	Վարսիկ	Սաստուրի	29/04/1990	14 Փ. 4				
292	Սամվելյան	Ալպարեն	Գրիգորի	22/01/1957	14 Փ. 4				
293	Սամվելյան	Գրիգորի	Ալպարենի	08/02/1990	14 Փ. 4				
294	Սամվելյան	Մամյա	Ալպարենի	08/02/1982	14 Փ. 4				

Precinct10/36

1717	Շարաֆյան	Թնայրիկ	Խորենի	20/06/1992	Առնիայի Փ. 80Ա				
1718	Քայրամյան	Անուշ	Գրիշայի	10/02/1965	Առնիայի Փ. 80Գ				
1719	Երենյան	Սուտաննա	Ավետիքի	09/01/1937	Առնիայի Փ. 81				
1720	Յարուստրատյան	Գեհառ	Բաւենին	13/03/1969	Առնիայի Փ. 81				

* * *

In 365 precincts more than 300 cases have been identified, when the commission member’s individual stamp is visible in front of the voter’s name, but the voter’s signature is missing.

Precinct5/05

160	Ամիրխանյան	Սամվել	Շահենի	15/08/1976	Դավիթբաշեն 1 Թոթ. 26 20				
161	Ամիրխանյան	Տիգրան	Շահենի	17/03/1971	Դավիթբաշեն 1 Թոթ. 26 20				
162	Կիրակոսյան	Աստղիկ	Դավթի	05/07/1952	Դավիթբաշեն 1 Թոթ. 26 20				
163	Քալոյան	Ռուզա	Ալտունի	22/05/1936	Դավիթբաշեն 1 Թոթ. 26 22				
164	Մննայան	Էրբի	Դաւիթբաշենի	09/12/1961	Դավիթբաշեն 1 Թոթ. 26 23				

Precinct8/48

218	Սիմոնյան	Որբերտ	Ղուկասի	30/04/1964	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 4				
219	Սիմոնյան	Սիրուհի	Սիմանի	00/00/1912	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 4				
220	Գալուստյան	Անահիտ	Սիշայի	09/08/1957	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 6				
221	Գեարգյան	Սարգոսա	Ապետանի	19/07/1990	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 6				

Precinct18/59

218	Սիմոնյան	Որբերտ	Ղուկասի	30/04/1964	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 4				
219	Սիմոնյան	Սիրուհի	Սիմանի	00/00/1912	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 4				
220	Գալուստյան	Անահիտ	Սիշայի	09/08/1957	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 6				
221	Գեարգյան	Սարգոսա	Ապետանի	19/07/1990	Շիրակի 4 Լրք. 4 6				

DIFFERENCE ACCORDING TO THE POLICE:

LISTS PUBLISHED BEFORE THE ELECTIONS AND THE LIST SIGNED BY THE VOTERS

In a number of precincts, the successive numbers of voters, their names and surnames do not match in signed lists and the lists published in advance by the police.

This can prove the fact that the voter lists were edited in the manner not defined by the law, in relation to which no official clarification was provided and no effective measure was undertaken.

Accurate quantitative numbers of violations and problems identified in this report are not publicized, as they have not been double-checked because of insufficient resources.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. This report makes it evident that it is necessary to envisage such legislative mechanisms, which would safeguard more comprehensive opportunities to monitor the process of drawing the list of voters for all participants in the election process, including observation organizations. That monitoring should include an opportunity to compare the voter lists with the population register.
2. It is necessary to define such clear-cut legislative procedures, which will be able and useful to ensure the exercising by everyone of his/her right to vote, at the same time creating opportunities and defining procedures for effective investigation of voter impersonation cases. Besides, it is necessary to envisage such mechanisms, which will allow to evaluate and neutralize the impact of such cases on the voting or the results of elections.

At the same time, it is necessary to define such a procedure, the application of which will not create confusion that existed until now in all the cases that the voter identified when registering for voting, that someone else has already voted instead of him/her.
3. Taking into consideration the fact that the resources of one organization were not sufficient to conduct a full and in-depth analysis of the signed voter lists published after the elections to the NA on 02.04.2017, the

measures undertaken allowed to identify such violations and problems, which could have had a significant impact on the voting/ election results, and the true picture of those violations and problems is much greater than what is revealed by this report, based on what is stipulated by Article 2 of the RA Constitution, as well as in exercise of Decree SDO 1364 by the RA Constitutional Court 28.04.2017, with which the Constitutional court stated the need to fully investigate the problems raised by the observer organizations, it is necessary that the relevant authorized bodies identify and investigate all the violations and problems raised by this and 02.04.2017 NA election reports, the results of which will give an opportunity to initiate such necessary and effective measures, which will exclude their repetition in future elections.

4. Based on the problems revealed in this report, and the possibility of their significant impact on the results of the elections, it is necessary to clarify the formulation of the possibility of searching the scanned voter lists defined by EC article (Article 9.4), so that such a system is installed, which will allow reciprocal and comparative check of all the available data in the published signed voter lists. At the same time, it is necessary to envisage mechanisms to ensure the time for the aforementioned checks will be sufficient and that the results will be comparable in terms of their impact on the elections/voting, within the scope of summarization of the election results.
5. Based on the problems identified by this report and the possibility of their significant impact on the results of the elections, taking into consideration that according to the official data registration of more than 225 thousand voters was not conducted via VADs and as a result of comparative analysis of IDs reflected on the lists their repetition was recorded, it is necessary either to define an obligation to enter the ID

data into the signed voter lists, or an equivalent mechanism, which will exclude the possibility of more than one voting with the same ID.

6. Within the scope of this research, because of the lack of resources it was impossible to conduct comparative analyses of addresses in the general list of voters during the 2015 constitutional referendum and the addresses identified as a result of analysis in the general list of voters during the election to NA on 02.04.17 (through automated computer software) where almost 106 000 voters were registered.

Besides, for the same reason, as well as because of insufficient individualization data (for IDs) it was not possible to analyze whether people with the same name, surname and patronymic existed or not, and the fact of their participation in the voting.

We should remind that the main report referred to this issue and around 208017 voters were identified whose names, surnames and patronymics repeated from 2 to 51 times. No official clarification was given in this relation. This problem as well highlights the necessity of entering the ID data and their effective monitoring.

7. In relation to the voter lists, the aforementioned problems, as well as reducing the risk of possible exaggeration of lists, voting instead of people who are not in Armenia, it is necessary to define relevant complex solutions in the process of drawing and developing the voter lists, one of which can be drawing different voter lists for voters in and outside Armenia, or including only voters in Armenia in voter lists.
8. Taking into consideration the facts raised in the main, as well as this report, which prove that the actions/inaction of commissions violated the electoral code, it is necessary that the law enforcement bodies take

relevant action and start a process of sanctioning all the commission members who infringed the law or participated in it, to suspend their powers and further involvement in the electoral process as commission members to replenish the system with new persons who will be able to ensure independence of the electoral commissions, their effectiveness and the legitimacy of the electoral process.

